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Botswana has been hailed as a “model of success”, an “African Miracle” and a 
“rare bird in Africa” because of its economic prosperity record and democratic 
achievements in a region of sharp contrasts. A well-developed bureaucracy, selfless 
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conceptual framework to the contemporary landscape of civil-military relations. Chapter 
II locates the evolution of the military within the template of statecraft, highlighting 
professionalization as a strategy of military development in the absence of a coherent 
defense bureaucracy and weak institutions of democratic oversight. The chapter 
underlines potential dangers of this institutional matrix to civil-military relations and 
governance. Chapter III captures the evolution of the state amidst elite cohesion and 
decontraction, demonstrating how these contrasts affect governance in general and civil-
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The post-Cold War era brings with it a renaissance in the study of civil-military 
relations. In recent years civil-military relations across the globe has entered into a 
turbulent era, fundamentally challenging the various models and what have been 
traditional patterns of the civil-military interface. The subject of civil-military relations 
continues to reassert itself in public policy and scholarly debates alike. Similarly, the 
search for democracy has also added momentum to the new debates in this area. Young 
democracies like Botswana equally face this challenge. The challenge is important 
particularly given the performance record Botswana has set since independence. At 8.5%, 
Botswana’s annual growth rate (mainly driven by diamonds) was the highest in the 
world, by far, between 1965 and 1989.1 In addition, Botswana is the only country on 
continental Africa to have sustained a democratic regime since independence.2  
Given these performance rates, Botswana, like a glittering pebble on sand, 
naturally lures an abundance of attention for analysts and observers alike. To use the 
“honey and vinegar”3 metaphor, Botswana’s success story is like honey. Yet, one would 
argue, the “container” has both. It is particularly the “vinegar” that is worrisome because 
it has the potential to undo the gains of the post-colonial state. In this sense, the focus of 
this work is on the country’s civil-military relations as an aspect of statecraft that 
potentially undercuts the success-story portrait of Botswana. Reshaping the civil-military 
interface is important, if not essential, to the consolidation of Botswana’s democracy. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess Botswana’s institutional matrix of 
democratic control of the military. This study proceeds from the premise laid by 
N’Diaye.4 In his comparative case on Botswana, he outlines professionalization, 
                                                 
1 World Bank, World Development Report 1991, pp.204-205. 
2 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001, p.294-295. 
3 For the honey and vinegar metaphor see Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan (eds), Honey 
and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 2000). 
4 Boubakar N’Diaye, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast and 
Kenya in Comparative Perspective (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001). 
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government legitimacy, and budgetary largesse as key instruments of the state in 
developing the military, thus reducing coup vulnerabilities. His contribution is invaluable 
to the study of democratic civil-military relations in Botswana. However, N’Diaye’s 
approach lacks the institutional dimension that would otherwise unravel the interaction of 
institutions and personalities (elites) beyond the generic laws of the country. The focus on 
professionalization as an instrument of control is problematic, as shall be shown later.  
N’Diaye’s analysis captures phenomena in Botswana’s civil-military relations without 
due attention to the institutional matrix of the day. Thus, the study leaves a void of 
analysis as to who does what and the consequences therein. It is this niche that will be 
focused on in order to fill the void. 
The thesis departs on the fundamental premise that Botswana faces serious 
institutional challenges of democratic control of the military. It outlines the current 
institutional framework of democratic control of the military, and identifies its inherent 
shortfalls, underlining their impact on civil military-relations and democratic governance. 
This thesis argues that the stability of the post-colonial state in Botswana and the 
relatively healthy civil-military relations are a false start. Following Molomo, it is argued 
that the country’s political stability is predicated on an uncertain military disequilibruim, 
one where the military’s autonomy is so high it may undermine state stability.5  The 
creation of a defense bureaucracy, and the re-engineering of other institutions of 
democratic control and oversight would help undo the military imbalance and broaden 
state stability. Arguing from institutionalist and organizational theory perspectives, the 
thesis endeavors to show that Botswana’s much-celebrated success is deceiving. Much of 
the analysis on the country’s success has focused on economic variables while missing an 
important sector of the state, the military and defense. 
                                                 
5 Mpho G. Molomo, “Civil-Military Relations in Botswana’s Developmental State,” African Studies 
Quarterly: The Online Journal for African Studies. http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i2a3.htm (accessed on 
3/8/2003), p.2. 
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C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis addresses Botswana’s institutional framework of democratic control. It 
seeks to show the problems associated with having executive control of the military 
centralized in the office of the president. The president, as the commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, has immense power over the military, including determining senior 
officers’ promotions. The role of parliament is conspicuously absent in this key 
democratic function. The role of parliament on defense and other national security 
matters is weak. The parliamentary oversight committee on foreign affairs, trade and 
security has too broad a mandate to effectively address issues of defense. The Defense 
Council, responsible for the superintendence and control of the military, is appointed by 
the president without the involvement of parliament. The council has no obligation to 
report to parliament. Currently Botswana does not have a defense bureaucracy. 
Consequently, defense is clubbed together with the police and civil service, an 
arrangement that does not bode well with efficiency and effectiveness in the utilization of 
national resources. These are major flaws in the country’s institutions of democratic 
control. The study puts these in perspective, and argues that they have the potential to 
undermine democratic civil-military relations and governance. In sum, the study 
underlines the need for defense reform as a continuing process of statecraft and good 
governance. The thesis therefore adds to the continuing debate on democratic civil-
military relations and defense reform in the country. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is: What challenges does Botswana’s current institutional 
framework of democratic control pose to civil-military relations and governance? 
E. JUSTIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
In this thesis civil-military relations is taken as the dependent variable (DV). 
Independent variables (IV’s) are institutions and elite cohesion. The institutional 
framework of democratic control is understood here to mean state institutions responsible 
for formulating and conducting defense and national security policy. The thesis draws on 
theories of civil-military relations, and institutional and/or organizational theories for 
reference. Based on the literature, the thesis studies the institutional framework, and 
4 
power relations between the executive, parliament, the military and civil society, and how 
their interactions affect civil-military relations. The approaches used are described below. 
F. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
1. The New Institutionalism 
The new institutionalism developed in response to the group theories of politics 
and structural-functionalism prominent in the political science literature of the 1960’s and 
1970’s.6 This school of thought has three different analytical approaches. However, for 
the purposes of this work only two are used. The first, historical institutionalism, 
perceives the institutional organization of the polity as the principal factor structuring 
collective behavior and generating distinctive outcomes. It emphasizes the asymmetries 
of power associated with the development and operation of institutions. The approach 
also focuses on how existing state capacities and policy legacies impact on future policy 
choices. Historical institutionalism sees development as periods of continuity punctuated 
by ‘critical junctures’ where substantial institutional changes take place, creating in the 
process, a ‘branching point’ marking a new path.7  In net, it must be noted that historical 
institutionalism does not pretend that institutions are the only causal force in politics.  
The second, rational choice institutionalism was mainly inspired by studies of 
American congressional behavior and how stable majorities for legislation were 
organized.8 This approach out-sourced fruitful analytical tools from the ‘new economics 
of organization,’ which underline the importance of property rights, rent-seeking and 
transaction costs to the operation and developments of institutions. Principal-agency 
theories are also emphasized here as a way of enforcing compliance and regulatory 
behavior in politics. Institutions sanction behavioral patterns and reduce uncertainties, 
and are able to endure and transcend historical epochs. 
                                                 
6 See Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the New Institutionalism,” 
Political Studies (1996), XLIV, and pp. 936-957; See also Sven Steinmo, et al., Structuring Politics: 
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
7 Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
8 See Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (eds), Congress, Structure and Policy (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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2. Organizational Theory 
Organizational theory derives from the broader body of the scientific management 
thought of the 1920’s that has influenced human organization. This approach is mainly 
concerned with the anatomy or structure of formal organizations and the rational behavior 
of its human parts.9 The theory underlines division of labor and specialization as key 
attributes of human organization. Bureaucracy generally implies a set of structural 
arrangements and specific patterns of behavior influenced by such structures. Thus 
bureaucracy has become a dominant feature of contemporary human organization and 
transcends all faculties of life, from economic and social life to political and military 
systems. Max Weber, in his Economy and Society, analyses the military as a Stand, or a 
profession, and as a bureaucratic organization.10 The contention here is that Botswana 
currently faces institutional and/or organizational problems of democratic control. The 
approach therefore sees the civil-military problematique through institutional lenses. 
Organizational theory provides the framework of institutional development. 
Focusing on managerial systems and processes, the approach provides insights on the 
dynamics of institutions such as bureaucracies. The military is a bureaucratic 
organization that is highly specialized in every sense of the word. It therefore requires a 
specialized civilian bureaucracy to manage and oversee it. The organizational theory 
approach provides a necessary template for understanding the institutional problems of 
democratic control. 
3. Democratic Civilian Control 
The concept of civilian control dates as far back as the days of Plato, Juvenal and 
Machiavelli.11 In recent history it has been extensively dealt with and popularized by 
Samuel Huntington, among others. Huntington defines civilian control as that distribution 
                                                 
9 Jay M. Shafritz and Phillip H. Whitbeck, Classics of Organization Theory (Oak Park, Illinois: Moore 
Publishing, 1978), p.1. See also William G. Scott, “Organization Theory: An Overview and Appraisal,” 
Academy of Management Journal (April 1961), pp.7-26; Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
10  Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds), Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1978.) 
11 See The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
1952); Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by W. K. Marriott (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
1952). 
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of political power between the military and civilian groups which is most conducive to 
the emergence of professional attitudes, and behavior among members of the officer 
corps.12 In recent political theory parlance this area of study has earned the nuance, 
“democratic control of the armed forces”(DCAF), emphasizing the importance of a 
democratic framework as the basis. Democratic control is thus generally understood to 
mean subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected civilians to superintend 
a given country’s affairs.13 Fundamentally, it means that the sole legitimate source for the 
direction and actions of the military is derived from civilians outside the military and 
defense establishment. The process is dynamic and susceptible to changing ideas, values, 
circumstances, issues and personalities, and to the stresses of crises and war.  
Democratic control is complex and multifaceted. The new institutionalism 
emphasizes looking beyond just the generic laws of the country in order to understand the 
‘black-box’ of civil-military relations. The challenge, therefore, is to study legal and 
institutional frameworks, functional relationships between the military, political authority 
and roles and missions of the armed forces. As tool of governance, democratic control 
emphasizes pluralism and accountability in the realm of defense. 
4. Military Professionalization 
Military professionalization is a product of the nineteenth century and is mainly 
associated with Western society. The notion of professionalism gained prominence with 
the emergence of the officer corps as an autonomous professional body, especially during 
the Napoleonic Wars. As a concept, professionalism has been popularized by, among 
others, Samuel Huntington.14 The professionalization model focuses attention on 
developing a professional ethos in the individual. Professionalism emphasizes developing 
the individual into voluntary subordination and self-control. Essentially, through training 
and education, the soldier is expected to develop self-imposed professional standards.  
                                                 
12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations  (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 83. 
13 Simon Lunn, “The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Principle and Practice,” in 
Connections: The Quarterly Journal, Vol.1, No.4 December, 2002 (Partnership for Peace Consortium of 
Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes), p.83. See also Douglas L. Bland,  “A Unified Theory 
of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society Vol. 26, No.1 (1997), p.10; and  “Patterns in Liberal 
Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society Vol. 27, No.4 (2001). 
14 Huntington, op cit. 
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The theoretical predicate of professionalization is the assumption that professional 
forces are generally amenable to civilian control. Professional forces tend to accept that 
civilian control and oversight would promote military efficiency and professional 
interaction between themselves and the political leadership based on technical expertise. 
Professionalism has thus become both a value and an institution of military development. 
It has increasingly become topical in the developing countries, with the waves of 
democratization that have swept the world. Botswana has employed it as a policy of 
military development. The absence of a defense bureaucracy undermines 
professionalization as a policy of development. 
These concepts provide a comprehensive framework for understanding defense 
organization and reform in general. They provide a useful analytical tool-kit for 
understanding issues of democratic control of the military and governance. More 
importantly, this conceptual framework provides signposts in the chapters, pointing to 
key landmarks of civil-military relations that one has to look for in navigating such 
terrain. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
The first chapter provides the rationale, objectives and justification of the study. It 
frames the research question and outlines the methodology used. Finally, the chapter 
identifies the variables, and defines some key terms and concepts used in the study. 
Chapter II outlines the current institutional framework of democratic control, 
noting that it is ad hoc, sketchy, and inefficient. It is noted that centralization of power 
and the state’s preoccupation with professionalism as a major instrument of democratic 
civilian control of the military overshadowed the development of a defense bureaucracy. 
Centralization of power in the presidency undermines the fundamental liberal principle of 
separation of powers, and renders other institutions of democratic control weak and 
wanting in their watchdog roles. In particular, this chapter highlights the managerial and 
organizational problems posed by the current arrangement, both for the state and the 
military. 
Chapter III explores the role that political and military elites have played in state 
development and how they influenced patterns of democratic civil-military relations over 
8 
the years. The chapter departs from the predicate that elite cohesion is an important 
variable in determining the direction of state policy and class organizational relationships. 
The chapter applies a comparative study of how elite cohesion has impacted the evolution 
of the state and civil-military relations over the years. First it explores this evolution 
during the first two decades of independence. Second, it looks at the 1990’s and beyond. 
Chapter IV proposes a new institutional matrix to the problems outlined in the 
previous chapters. A defense review is the first step towards defense reform. The creation 
of a defense bureaucracy is seen here as the basic formula for addressing core 
institutional problems in the current arrangement. In addition, it is argued that other 
instruments of oversight such as the Defense Council and the Parliamentary Committee 
on Trade, Foreign Affairs and Security should be reformed to meet the challenging 
dynamics of national security and defense. In conclusion, this chapter draws the reader’s 
attention to the resources that defense reform would require. Key among these would be 
political will from all the stakeholders in the process to give the exercise the momentum, 
life and meaning it deserves. 
9 
II.  BEYOND THE PRISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
OF DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL  
A. BACKGROUND 
Reeling from years of colonial neglect and underdevelopment, Botswana gained 
independence in 1966 as one of the poorest countries in the world. When the colonial era 
ended, there was virtually no infrastructure to talk about. In a territory of two hundred 
and twenty thousand square miles, only twenty-five miles of tarmac road existed.15 Gross 
domestic product (GDP) stood at a paltry US $ 60 million and consisted mainly of beef 
exports to Britain and South Africa. Added to this, no bureaucracy existed at 
independence. Botswana inherited a bare-bones bureaucracy staffed almost wholly by 
expatriates.16 This was primarily because the colonial state was characterized by 
administrative neglect and did little to foster local institutions.17  Following from this 
neglect, the education system was left equally underdeveloped. The consequence, 
Molomo further notes, was that Botswana did not posses the requisite skills to take over 
their public service. 
However, much was to change in a fairly short space of time. State institutions 
expanded rapidly, giving way to a fairly well developed bureaucracy. Beginning with 
2,986 employees in 1968, the number in central government expanded to 10,083 by 1979 
and 56,416 by 1996.18 Consequently, Botswana’s economy catapulted into one of the 
fastest growing in the world. The country rose from one of the most impoverished 
countries in Africa, with a GNP per capita of less than $80 a year in 1966, to a dynamic 
                                                 
15 Mike Sill, “Sustaining a Success Story,” Geographical Magazine1993, Vol.42, p.37; also refer to 
David Anderson, “President Seretse Khama: A Personal View,” in Gwendolyn Carter and Phillip Morgan, 
(eds), From the Frontline: Speeches of Sir Seretse Khama   (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute, 1980), 
p.xv. 
16 Amy R. Poteete, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Challenging the Property Rights Paradigm in 
Botswana,” Governance, A Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol.16, No.4, October 
2003, p.539. 
17 Mpho G. Molomo, “The Bureaucracy and Democracy in Botswana” in John Holm and Patrick 
Molutsi, (eds), Democracy in Botswana: Proceedings of a Symposium held in Gaborone, 1-5 August 1988 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1989), p.239. 
18 Amy R. Poteete, op cit. 
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middle income economy with per capita earning of nearly $1, 800 in 1996.19  These high 
levels of growth have been unmatched elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.  
This is indeed the story of a lifetime. In one sense, this success story has been 
largely attributed to a strong and dedicated leadership, which has been able to harness the 
country’s resources for the greater benefit of the citizens. In another, a well-developed 
bureaucracy is also credited with the ability of the country’s economy to position itself 
into the ‘projectile’ it has so far displayed. As a result of its meteoric leap, Botswana 
earned itself accolades of all sorts. Some have hailed it as a “model for success.”20 Others 
have dubbed it an “African Miracle”21, and a “rare bird in Africa.”22 
Botswana’s exceptionality is anchored first and foremost on sound economic 
management that is also driven by effective policy formulation and implementation. 
Secondly, it is the primacy of technological rationality, bureaucratic unity and insulation 
of economic policy making from political and social pressures that have served an 
institutional basis for effective economic management.23 According to another 
observation, this technocratic approach has dominated the country’s development 
planning and has given the bureaucracy considerable influence in defining the country’s 
economic direction.24 While the country had a small percentage of educated citizens with 
professional expertise, it relied on the remaining ‘layer’ of the colonial bureaucracy that 
was in place to provide a basis for bureaucratization. Government, therefore, went out to 
educate and train personnel to equip them with requisite skills to man the new posts in the 
country’s bureaucracy. In sum, a dedicated elite, frugal in fiscal policy, was able to 
develop a strong state bureaucracy and equip it with dedicated civil servants over time. 
                                                 
19 Mpho G. Molomo, “Civil-Military Relations in Botswana’s Developmental State,” African Studies 
Quarterly: The Online Journal for African Studies. http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i2a3.htm (accessed 
on 3/8/2003), p.3 
20 Louis Picard, The Politics of Development in Botswana: Model for Success? (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987). 
21 Abdi Ismael Samatar, An African Miracle: State, Class and Leadership and Colonial Legacy in 
Botswana Development (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 1999). 
22 Zibani Maundeni, et al, “Democratic Governance and Common Security in Southern Africa: The 
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This leadership was able to harness and manage available resources prudently, thus 
contributing to a strong developmental state.  
By contrast, while bureaucratization was the fundamental focus of state 
organization, professionalization became the cornerstone of defense and military 
organization. This chapter focuses on the two models, bureaucratization and 
professionalization, as a basis of analysis and endeavors to show how the two have 
influenced civil-military relations in post-colonial Botswana. Over the twenty-seven 
years of the Botswana Defense Force’s existence, there is no unitary defense bureaucracy 
that primarily manages, oversees and controls the military. Instead, the state has relied on 
a sketchy and ad hoc arrangement of defense management. In essence, this chapter 
contends that the post-colonial state has over-expended resources on military 
professionalism to the detriment of developing a defense bureaucracy.  
B. INTRODUCTION 
Against this backdrop, it is clear that in the bigger ‘laboratory’ of Botswana’s 
developmental success, there are other ‘institutional crucibles’ that have been neglected. 
Their fission may potentially undermine the country’s democratic gains.  The benefits of 
a strong bureaucracy have been unnecessarily overstated and have consequently 
overshadowed other areas that have been neglected for a long time. The laudatory praises 
the country has received may potentially lull it to sleep. Perhaps, as Botswana’s Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation Minister recently put it, Botswana should not “get 
too excited about the accolades the country has been receiving from the international 
community.”25 In some cases, he argues, the compliment is  “by default” as the country is 
not being compared with the best. This chapter identifies the challenges of 
professionalization as an instrument of military development without the concurrent 
development of a defense bureaucracy. The chapter contends that the post-colonial state 
has been preoccupied with military professionalism while neglecting the development of 
a defense bureaucracy to manage the professionalizing military. This tilted development 
has resulted in a civilian-military imbalance of power and expertise tantamount to 
undermining state stability. Because of lack of civilian expertise on military and defense 
                                                 
25 See Letshwiti Tutwane, “New Hope For Women in the BDF,” Mmegi, Vol.20, No.73, 2,December 
2003. http://www.mmegi.bw/2003/December/tuesday2/886551426516.html (accessed 12/03/2003) 
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issues, civilian political authority heavily relies on the military to lead military and 
defense policy. Consequently, the military enjoys immense autonomy, and often finds 
itself having to play the ‘baker’ and consumer of the defense policy ‘cake’ at the same 
time. This skewed power symmetry has the potential to corrode and undercut democratic 
control and oversight of the military. By extension, the imbalance creates managerial and 
organizational deficiencies in defense. It also affects the capacity of oversight and control 
mechanisms within the executive and the legislative branches of government. 
 The military becomes a natural area of interest for three major reasons. First and 
foremost because of its historically meddlesome disposition in African politics. Second, 
the military deserves attention because it has been a neglected area of debate and 
scholarly attention in Botswana. Third, and more importantly, it begs for analysis because 
it continues to consume a fairly large portion of national resources in the country. 
Between 1977 and 1980, government spent an average of 4 to 9.7 percent of the national 
budget on the military. In 1993 military expenditure was 4.9% of GDP.26 This average 
figure has continued into the 21st Century. For purposes of political responsibility and 
democratic accountability, it is critical to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness with 
which the  “guns”27 are managed. A defense bureaucracy naturally becomes the template 
of analysis.  
C. BUREAUCRACRATIZATION: THE CONCEPT 
Seen as an organization unto itself, the military deserves a peculiar form of 
organization. A leading authority in the bureaucratization literature, Max Weber, has 
written extensively about the timeless importance of bureaucracy as a form of human 
organization. Weber analyzed the military as a stand, or a profession and as a 
bureaucratic organization. Modern officialdom, Weber argues, functions in a specific 
manner with the following core attributes: 
• There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are 
generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations. 
• The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a 
firmly ordered system of super-subordination in which there is supervision                                                  
26 Dale, op cit, p. 224. 
27 For a detailed analysis of the Guns-or-Butter metaphor, see Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: The 
Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.525-542. 
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of the lower offices by the higher ones. Once established, and having 
fulfilled its task, an office tends to continue in existence and be held by 
another incumbent. 
• The management of office is based upon written documents (‘the files’), 
which are preserved in their original or draught form. There is, therefore a 
staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts who along with the 
respective apparatus and material implements and the files, make up a 
‘bureau.’ 
• Office management usually presupposes thorough and expert training. 
• The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or 
less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge 
of these rules represents a special technical learning, which the officials 
possess.28 
Most modern organizations, from private organizations to states, conform to this 
model and have found it useful because of its general efficiency and effectiveness. It has 
essentially become the generic order of doing business. Weber, however cautions that 
bureaucracy tends to degenerate into a bad form of organization that becomes a ‘steel-
hard cage’ not easily accessible to the vast majority of the population.29   
Bureaucratization emphasizes structure, organization and specialization. Further a 
bureaucracy develops norms, values, practices and processes that come to stay with it. As 
such there is continuity and longevity in the life of a bureaucracy. Bureaucratic 
institutions therefore have a life of their own. They endure and have a demonstration 
effect. The rational for a defense bureaucracy implies that the armed forces are 
sufficiently different from other social organizations. Given its structure, culture, 
recruitment and skills requirement, legal status plus the degree of social integration into 
society, the military is distinct. As Christopher Dandeker puts it: 
The military is unique in nature and extent of the demands it places upon 
its personnel. They are obliged to train to kill and to sacrifice self, to 
participate in a military community where one works, lives and socializes 
                                                 
28 H.H Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946), pp.196-198. 
29 D. Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1987), p.152.  
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with other service personnel and, when necessary, to respond to a 24-hour 
commitment with the risk of separation from family at short notice.30 
By contrast, Botswana’s defense bureaucracy is sketchy and simple if anything. In 
fact, it conforms to a “simple structural configuration.”31 The simple structure is 
characterized by what is not elaborated. Typically, it has little or no technostructure, few 
support staffers, a loose division of labor, minimal differentiation among its units, and a 
small managerial hierarchy. As will be shown below, Botswana’s defense organization 
typifies this analogy to a large extent. 
D. PROFESSIONALIZATION: THE CONCEPT  
Military professionalism is an instrument of civilian government control of the 
military. The professionalization model focuses attention on developing a professional 
ethos in the individual. Professionalism emphasizes developing the individual into 
voluntary subordination and self-control. Essentially, through training and education, the 
soldier is expected to develop self-imposed professional standards. The theoretical 
predicate of professionalization is the assumption that professional forces are generally 
amenable to civilian control. Professional forces tend to accept that civilian control and 
oversight would promote military efficiency and professional interaction between 
themselves and the political leadership based on technical expertise.  
However, professionalization has its own shortfalls. First it is to be noted that 
professionalization is difficult to quantify. Secondly, as Herbert Howe cautions, 
professionalism usually requires an institutionalized system of stable and widely accepted 
political values that exist independent of a specific regime.32 Such institutionalization can 
only be understood within the broader parameters of a bureaucracy primarily geared at 
enforcing it. Assessing the professionalization model, Morris Janowitz, has argued that, 
                                                 
30 Christopher Dandeker, “Flexible Forces for the Twenty-First Century,” Facing Uncertainty Report 
No.1 (Karstad: Department of Leadership, Swedish National Defense College, 1999), p.85.Also refer to 
Christopher Dandeker, “The Military in Democratic Societies: New Times and New Patterns of Civil-
Military Relations,” in Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis ed. by Jurgen 
Kuhlmannn and Jean Callaghan (Hamburg: Lit, 2000). 
31 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp.299-347. 
32 Herbert M. Howe, op cit. 
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professionalism is not sufficient to ensure responsible specialists.33 The focus on the 
professionalization approach tends to be on structures of stability and equilibrium, which 
are difficult to attain in a relationship whose borderlines are fluid and difficult to manage. 
The idea of recognizing a sphere of autonomous military professionalism, and of 
having a professional, politically neutral corps of military officers, rests upon two 
problematical theoretical foundations.34 First, because the arguments are predicated on 
classical organization theories that suggest that politics can be separated from 
administration. Subordination of the military to political supremacy does not imply total 
and unquestioning obedience by the military or utter non-involvement in political matters 
at all. In the real world of civil-military interface, the borderlines often become 
increasingly blurred. Secondly, the functional premise of professionalism is that peer-
group control or professional self-control is enough to guarantee an altruistic orientation 
for professionals in their daily execution of chores. Equally relevant, equating military 
professionalism and voluntary subordination, holds fewer insights for professionalism as 
a reliable and enduring model. History is replete with examples of armed forces that were 
deemed professional, both by domestic and international standards, but have nevertheless 
challenged civilian authority, either toppling government or coming close to usurping 
state power. At the end of the day, it is evident that professionalism as a single state 
strategy for military development can be detrimental both to military development and 
state stability. 
E. MILITARY GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONAL STAGNATION: THE 
PARADOX OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
In order to place the two models in context, let us now focus briefly on the 
evolution of the military and defense in Botswana. A brief outline of the history of the 
BDF is provided in order to demonstrate here that professionalization was a purposeful 
policy instrument of the post-colonial state for developing the military. By design or 
default, little was done to tie this professionalization with a distinct defense bureaucracy 
                                                 
33 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: The 
Free Press, 1961), p.343. See also Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing 
Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977). 
34 Tom Skauge, “Contraction and Detraction: Non-Equilibrium Studies of Civil-Military Relations,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol.31, No.2, 1994, p.190. 
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to compliment inherent weaknesses of the approach. The management of defense has 
remained centralized in the office of the presidency, with no technostructure, and few if 
any staffers in the state bureaucracy. Meanwhile, other institutions in the state 
bureaucracy developed well-organized mini bureaucracies that later took better 
bureaucratic form and organization. The expenditure pattern alluded to above, goes to 
show this tilted commitment. The net result has been the over-development of the 
military, and the underdevelopment of civilian expertise in government. 
Defense management and reform fall within the core template of statecraft. These 
efforts seek to answer the paradoxical question “Sed quis custodiet ipso custodies?”35 
(But who will guard the guardians?). History reminds us that since the birth of nation-
states, civilians have grappled with the problem of how to subordinate armies to their 
will. Whether they presided over colonies, newly independent states, or modern 
twentieth-century totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic régimes, political leaders have 
always had to balance the twin goals of harnessing enough military force to defeat their 
enemies, and ensure that that force is not turned against themselves.36   
In the history of human organization and statecraft, the question  “who guards the 
guardians?” has remained a timeless problematique of civilian control. This question of 
civilian control of the military is a particularly polemical one in Africa where the military 
has a rich history of perpetual involvement in politics. Several studies have been done on 
the dynamics of military involvement in the region, leading some to conclude that, “many 
of Africa’s militaries are unprofessional, lacking both technical expertise for combat and 
political responsibility to the state.”37 Due to these attributes, combined with problems of 
weak political institutions, these militaries, it is argued, have had the incentives to indulge 
in politics, often leading to a spiral of military take-overs.  
The development of the military, and its existence within the framework of 
civilian supremacy is therefore a major problem of African realpolitik. For young and 
                                                 
35 Juvenal quoted in Claude E.Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, 
Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974), p.2.  
36 David Pion-Berlin, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p.1. 
37 Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2001), p.9. 
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fairly successful democracies such as Botswana, the raison d’ etre of democratic control 
is necessary to ensure that national security and defense issues are subordinated to the 
national interest. This is particularly so when judged against the success story that the 
country has been. In net therefore, the greater challenge for democratic governance is the 
attempt to strike a balance between the two professionalization and bureaucratization 
without necessarily compromising the efficiency of the military to perform its functions 
on the one hand, and ensuring that it operates within the framework of democratic control 
without endangering state stability and legitimacy, on the other. For old and young 
nation-states alike, this is a time-tested platform of contest.  
1. The Botswana Defense Force: A Brief History 
Concerned with the phenomenon of military intervention in politics, Botswana 
deliberately deferred the creation of the military despite the fact that at independence the 
constitution provided for its existence. During the transition to independence, Prime 
Minister Seretse Khama rejected as “ridiculous” the opposition’s calls for the creation of 
an army.38 Earlier in March of 1966, the Bechuanaland Protectorate Legislative 
Assembly defeated a motion tabled by opposition member Motlhagodi, calling for 
“military training as the first step toward the creation of an army.”39 This institutional 
tapestry marked a fundamental departure in traditional statecraft in that the state was born 
without the “war making” capacity. The rest of Africa’s decolonizing states either 
inherited a military establishment or created one on attaining independence. The raison 
d’etre for such craftsmanship is in order here. As Welch argues, creating an army at 
independence brought the intractable budgetary, political, ethnic, discipline and other 
problems associated with colonial armies.40 Instead, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), an 
offshoot of the colonial state, was equipped as a paramilitary force to face the national 
security challenges of the new state. The PMU therefore played the dual role of internal 
policing and providing territorial security for the new nation. 
                                                 
38  “No Army Wanted,” The Johannesburg Star 24 August 1966,p.14. 
39 Refer to Bechuanaland Legislative Assembly Official Report, Hansard No.15, pp.19-25. 
40 Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule, (North Scituate, Massachusetts: 
Duxbury Press, 1974), pp.308-309. 
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However, sooner it became clear that the PMU was inadequate as a national 
security instrument. Meanwhile, the security situation in the region was changing 
drastically. The liberation war in Southern Rhodesia escalated in the mid-seventies. 
Rhodesian forces were increasingly crossing into Botswana, raiding villages, kidnapping 
people, and even killing some. Due to this major shift in the regional security dynamics it 
became apparent that the creation of an army was inevitable. Consequently, government 
bowed to this increasing pressure and made the creation of an army a priority. Thus the 
Botswana Defense Force Bill was tabled before parliament in 1977. It must also be noted 
here that the creation of the BDF could not have come about without the agitation of 
political and civil society. In the 1977 debate, leader of the Botswana People’s Party 
(BPP), Mr. Phillip Matante, welcomed government’s decision to create an army noting, 
“I give the Bill my fullest support.”41 Other legislators from both sides of the house, 
especially those from the north, were equally adamant about the creation of an army. The 
point to take home is simply that at this point, there was political consensus for such a 
policy because of the dictates of the situation, a sharp contrast to the 1966 economic and 
security juxtaposition. 
2. Professionalization: A Choice Model for Military Development 
The fear of coups reverberated in the parliamentary debates preceding the BDF’s 
creation. Among others, legislators such as Englishman Kgabo cautioned government to 
guard against “greedy and self-seeking leaders of the military who might undermine 
Botswana’s democracy with a coup.”42 Thus when the military was finally created in 
1977, government undertook a deliberate policy to create a professional, well trained and 
disciplined army. Arguably, the commitment of the state to military professionalism is 
not in doubt. Resources have been spent immensely in this area. Richard Dale for 
instance, argues that one of the government’s commitments to professionalism was “the 
meticulous details in the 1977 Botswana Defense Force Act regarding military 
jurisprudence.”43 He further contends that the Act was an unequivocal signal to the 
                                                 
41 Honorable Phillip Matante, quoted in Ernest Chilisa, “MP’s Give Blessing to Army Bill,” Daily 
News, March 31,1977,No.64, p.2. 
42 Ernest Chilisa, op cit, pp.1-2. 
43 Richard Dale, “The Creation and Use of the Botswana Defense Force,” in The Round Table Vol.290 
(1984), p.222. 
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officer corps and ordinary soldiers alike that the most professional conduct was expected 
from them.  
A further indication of this commitment was the emphasis on training the officer 
corps. Within a short period of the BDF’s creation sixteen (16) officers were sent to the 
Sandhurst Military Academy to join Ian Khama.44 In March of 1980, Botswana entered 
into an agreement which provided American training for the BDF, and also provided for 
a tour of United States army bases in order for General Merafhe to assess the “various 
types of training available.” This commitment and support has been successfully 
sustained over the years. In fact, the US has been the largest single contributor to the 
development of the BDF to date. Government has relentlessly ensured that this 
commitment is sustained. 
Over a decade the BDF grew in size from a paltry 300 men to about 4000.Ever 
since, the BDF has grown in strength as more and more developments took place. 
Between 1977 and 1980,Government spent an average of 4 to 9.7 percent of the national 
budget on the military, part of which went to training and education. Contrasted with the 
rest of Africa, analysts argue, the military in Botswana has made significant strides into 
the realm of professionalism. As a result, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) stands out 
as an exception of the ‘norm’ of coups and deleterious intervention in politics in the 
continent. Observers from across various divides have referred to the BDF as 
“professional, multiracial, and well trained.”45 This effort of professionalization was 
therefore purposeful, deliberate and well planned by the political leaders. It is clear that 
the leadership chose the professionalization option given its utility, particularly in 
minimizing coup vulnerabilities and therefore stabilizing the state. 
Judging by the level of commitment to professionalization, it can be safely argued 
that the ‘coup threat’ that was topical in the formative years of post-colonial Botswana 
has been fairly minimized. Given the cumulative loyalties and political-military elite 
cohesion, plus appeasement strategies of the state to the military, such a threat has largely 
                                                 
44 ibid, p.224. 
45 Jane’s Sentinel. Botswana Country Profile in http://www. Jane’s. Com/public/geo-
political/sentinel/saf/botswna.html (accessed 09/24/03).  In the interviews conducted by this author 
respondents also expressed confidence in the BDF’s professionalism. 
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fallen behind. However, given the problems of measuring professionalism, it is never 
clear as to when the optimum benchmark has or has not been attained. The threshold is 
simply difficult to establish.  
The extent to which this professionalization has enhanced efficiency and 
effectiveness in the case of Botswana remains a moot case. Professionalism becomes a 
polemical gauge or unit of measure, especially given that there are no established 
strategic and performance frameworks against which it could be measured. In the first 
instance, there is no national security strategy that outlines the roles and missions of the 
various units of national security. Secondly, there is no military and defense policy 
against which such professionalism could be measured. Thirdly, despite a history of close 
to three decades of the BDF’s existence, there has never been a strategic defense review 
of the military and defense in Botswana. Consequently, we cannot ascertain with any 
grain of precision as to what it is we want to achieve with a military the size the BDF; or 
what our major shortfalls in traversing the slippery road of civil-military relations over 
the years have been, and how best they could be improved. In the absence of these 
roadmaps and barometers therefore, it is doubtful as to whether we know where we are 
going. 
The challenge of defense reform, and the creation of a modern bureaucracy to run 
the military remains the missing link-pin in the country’s development and its civil-
military interface. The need for a bureaucracy is particularly relevant, inter alia, when the 
military is seen as a pressure group, and an important player in state consolidation. The 
national defense landscape has changed quite considerably. Threat perceptions have also 
been altered. There is relative peace and stability in the region. Thus for Botswana, the 
problem for the state “is the relation of the military expert to the politician.”46 
                                                 
46 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap, 1964), p.20. 
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F. DEMOCRATIC CONTROL: THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL MATRIX 
AND ITS CHALLENGES 
This section seeks to demonstrate the underdevelopment and weaknesses of 
institutions of democratic control and oversight. It also endeavors to highlight the 
problems of the over-involvement of the military in national security policy, often 
because of their expertise and lack of a challenging or counter-balancing force from the 
civilian side. It underscores the potential danger that this cumulative power 
disequillibrium poses for democratic civil-military relations now, and its bigger stakes for 
democratic governance in the future. In order to signpost this analysis well, I focus 
primarily on the executive and parliament as instruments of objective control, and civil 
society. Civil society is considered because it is an important watchdog of democracy and 
also a key player in democratic control outside the state. Under the executive, the chapter 
investigates the Presidency, the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public 
Administration (MPAPA), and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
(MFDP) as key instruments of executive control over the military. Under the same ambit, 
this chapter also considers the life of the Defense Council and its utility as an ad hoc 
bureaucracy superintending the BDF. 
In order to set the framework of the argument, a basic definition of civilian 
control is relevant. Huntington defines civilian control as that distribution of political 
power between the military and civilian groups, which is most conducive to the 
emergence of professional attitudes, and behavior among members of the officer corps.47 
In recent political theory parlance this area of study has earned the nuance, “democratic 
control of the armed forces”(DCAF). DCAF is thus generally understood to mean 
subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected civilians to superintend a 
given country’s affairs. In its fullest sense, it means that all decisions regarding the 
defense of the country – the organization, deployment, and use of the armed forces; the 
setting of military priorities and requirements; and the allocation of the necessary 
resources – are made by democratic leadership and scrutinized by the legislative body. 
This is done in order to ensure support and legitimacy, the ultimate aim being to ensure 
armed forces serve the societies they protect, and that military policies and capabilities 
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are consistent with political objectives and economic resources.48 Democratic civilian 
control is therefore done through a well-articulated hierarchy between civil authority and 
the military. This hierarchy emphasizes a form of consolidated bureaucratic organization. 
Normatively, democratic control provides transparency, and spells out responsibilities 
between the military and civilian authority over issues of defense policy, budgets, 
programs and the professional execution of policy. Civilian control of the military is thus 
considered a prerequisite for democratic governance. 
1. The Current Matrix 
Botswana’s generic law provides for a strong presidency with wide-ranging 
executive powers. Section 48 of the constitution provides that the president is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.49 The president is further empowered by the 
Botswana Defense Force Act to appoint the commander of the BDF and other senior 
officers of lieutenant colonel rank and above. Subsection 8 (2) restricts the operational 
use of the BDF to the president. The Act further provides that the president may delegate 
such responsibility as he may think fit to the commander. In addition, a Defense Council, 
established per section 8(1) of the BDF Act50 is charged with the control, direction and 
superintendence of the force, and acts as an advisory body to the president on defense. 
The council is appointed by the president and is not statutorily mandated to report to 
parliament. The Defense Council has no staffers. Since its creation the Council has had 
problems conforming to its schedule of business.  If there were any records kept about its 
proceedings, they were scanty. Its utility to Botswana’s contemporary landscape is 
questionable.51 The Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Pubic Administration, an 
extension of the presidency, is theoretically responsible for the day-to-day running of the 
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BDF. The relationship between the president and the Minister of PAPA on defense is not 
very clear. Currently the military (over 10,000) and the police (approximately 6000) are 
administered from the same office. In addition the same ministry is responsible for the 
civil service. As part of the state bureaucracy the military alone constitutes the second 
largest formal sector employer after the civil service.52  Under the current there is no 
permanent staff solely dedicated to managing or attending to defense issues on a day-to-
day basis. Management of defense is therefore ad hoc. Instead, all administrative work of 
the military from recruitment, budgeting to acquisition, training and operations is done at 
BDF headquarters. While other components of the state bureaucracy have grown in size 
and complexity, defense has remained static. 
The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) also plays a major 
role in controlling the military and acts as an extension of executive control and 
oversight. The ministry exercises fiscal discipline and scrutinizes and allocates the 
military budget along with those of other line ministries and departments. Like other 
budget submissions, the BDF’s budget is subjected to the same rigors that ordinarily 
apply to all other departments despite its peculiarities. It is not a farfetched imagination to 
conclude that given the level of expertise on defense budgeting in this ministry, there are 
a lot of specifications within the budget that are beyond the comprehension of the 
staffers.   
Likewise, the parliamentary watchdog role is feeble. The two key oversight 
instruments, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the committee of foreign affairs, 
trade and security are weak and have been overrun by the executive more often.53 They 
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also lack expertise on defense. Legislatures have an important role to play in the 
formulation of defense and military policy, as well as monitoring its implementation. 
Input into the policy process from broad-based sectors of society legitimizes policy and 
helps develop consensus. The needs of society and the military are more likely to be 
balanced to the extent that representatives from all segments of society are consulted in 
the policy process.54 However, parliamentary oversight of the military is conspicuously 
weak in Botswana. 
This institutional framework poses a number of problems. First, it concentrates 
too much power over the military in the presidency. Critiques have argued that to entrust 
the national security and defense of the country in one office with such immense powers 
is unhealthy for democracy.55 The current arrangement also gives the presidency 
unilateral power on officer promotions without the involvement of parliament. As such, 
organizational power is inappropriately distributed in favor of the executive, while 
marginalizing the elected representatives. This is no doubt, a fundamental departure from 
democratic practice. This obviously opens the system to possible abuse as the incumbent 
may use this latitude to build loyalties in order to control the military. Further, this power 
asymmetry limits democratic participation by other elected officials in the development 
of the military and defense policy. In the process democratic accountability on a major 
consumer of national resources is undermined. At the end of the day, democratic control 
of the military is seriously compromised. As Giraldo rightly points out, “the need for the 
legislature to approve and review expenditures is a permanent source of influence.”56 
When the same legislature fails in this key role, especially over a powerful sector of the 
state that consumes substantially high expenditure averages of the national budget, then 
there is reason for alarm. 
Secondly, the framework undermines administrative efficiency and effectiveness 
on national defense matters. It perpetuates military development through 
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professionalization without simultaneously developing civilian expertise on the military 
and defense. The current over-involvement of the military in defense policy emanates 
from this problematique. Moreover, the arrangement denies military and civilian staffers 
to interact at par under a professional work environment where they would share 
expertise and influence defense policy on an authoritative position. An institutional 
tapestry bringing civilian and military expertise together is desirable for a number of 
reasons. Primarily, it creates new working relationships that are vital in civil-military 
relations. Such relations are building blocks for mutual understanding and trust between 
the military and its political masters. Even more importantly, this military-civilian 
marriage promotes cumulative knowledge and management expertise on defense. 
Under the current framework the uniform approach to expenditure control and 
management has a major weakness. It generalizes about all departments based on 
financial and administrative controls of the budget process. As a result it neglects the 
underlying factors peculiar to each department, more so to defense. Under the current 
arrangement, it is evident that given the number of departments that fall under the Office 
of the President, there is inadequate attention given to the details of the defense budget, 
especially in the long term. M.D. Hobkirk provides recommendations for defense 
organization that take account of the peculiarities of defense: 
• A powerful central policy and planning staff (with service officers and 
civilian administrators and scientists) to plan defense policy, the budget 
and weapon systems; 
• A planning, programming and budgeting system with functional 
categories or programs directly related to the specific tasks of the armed 
forces; 
• A long-term multi-year budget system to provide as stable an environment 
as possible for future plans; and 
• d) A full-career civilian bureaucracy of administrators and scientists to 
operate the system in equal partnership with their service colleagues.57 
The benefits of a bureaucracy outlined by Hobkirk are conspicuously absent in 
Botswana’s defense management system.  
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Despite the high averages of defense expenditure over the years, there are 
indications both within the military and in government that a lot could be done to 
improve this trend. In the absence of a tangible military doctrine, a defense policy, and 
national security strategy, it is difficult to measure the cost of the military against 
anything. The formula is simply not there. The point to be emphasized here is that while 
the need for better infrastructure and equipment may be justifiable in a given time frame, 
especially given the young history of the BDF, the political obligation to ensure efficient 
and effective utilization of these comparatively immense resources remains omnipresent. 
Given institutional biases, the possibility for underjudgement or overjudgement of the 
defense realm cannot be overruled. 
Thirdly, defense and policing are two distinct and sensitive roles of the state to be 
jointly administered together. Doing so may simply blur the distinction between the two 
and compromise the objective development of both. Similarly, the civil service is a 
different entity of the state bureaucracy and should not be mixed with either one of the 
two, especially given its size vis-a-vis the two.  
Finally, the absence of a defense bureaucracy also means that there is no unit that 
promotes research in both academic and policy discourses on the military and defense in 
the country. Research and documentation are fundamental tenets of institutions. They 
provide the lifeblood to institutional reform and development, and promote a culture of 
learning about he military and its technologies. They give the institution a recreative 
ability that transcends generations. 
The net result of the current arrangement is that defense and security is crowded 
by other demands and is not given the due attention it deserves. The peculiarity of 
national defense dictates that it be handled by a defense bureaucracy solely dedicated and 
responsible for it. This is because defense is not just another spending department.58 Its 
uniqueness comes with its structure, organization, employment of resources and cultural 
values and norms. The “management of violence” is a vocation in its own right and 
carries with it, characteristics and qualities that are complex and intricate. Such 
peculiarity must gain recognition even at the political superstructure. Under the current 
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arrangement, the military has largely been as all the other sectors of the public service, 
and has consequently been denied a bureaucracy attuned to its specificity. To this extent, 
the BDF has enjoyed immense autonomy to influence and/or even determine key aspects 
of defense policy from recruitment to procurement policy whereas it is supposed to 
implement them. In essence the BDF ‘bakes its own cake and eats it.’ In addition, the 
arrangement absolves itself from executing the continuous daily checks and balances of a 
higher political structure over the military and defense. It is not therefore unreasonable to 
imagine that the window of abuse for patronage and graft within the BDF remains open. 
The number of trial cases relating to abuse of office, both within the military legal system 
and in the civilian courts, is telling of the depth of this dilemma.59 
As a result of these weaknesses, the military has continued to enjoy considerable 
autonomy. In fact, there are indications that on a number of occasions strategic policy 
issues have been referred to the BDF command where the expectation was that political 
authority would be the lead decision maker in the process. Examples help illustrate this 
weak institutional portrait. Some observers have argued that the decision to build 
Thebephatshwa Air Base (other wise known as “Operation Silver Eagle”) near 
Molepolole is a clear indication of the remarkable degree of autonomy that the BDF 
enjoys. According to Africa Confidential, the BDF independently concluded that 
Botswana’s interest required the construction of a large air force base, and prevailed in its 
desire to carry out the operation despite the general reduction of tensions in the sub-
region and belt-tightening measures in Botswana.60 
If this story is to be bought, it demonstrates how the independence of political 
authority over defense policy is undermined. Simply put, this relationship subordinates 
the political point of view to the military point of view.  Undoubtedly, this composure of 
civil-military relations undercuts the authority of the civilian leadership to control and 
oversee the military. Further, this creates an imbalance in that when the “player” (in this 
case the BDF) determines the rules of the game, the “referee” (civilian authority) has 
little control over the “game.” At the political level, when such a situation obtains, the 
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dangers to democratic control potentially loom large. Military accountability to the 
civilian authority may not carry the same obligations under such weak superintendence. 
Perhaps this situation may be telling about what some observers have referred to as “the 
overbearing influence of the military in the country’s politics.”61 Democratically elected 
representatives should have the final word on all defense matters without being pushed 
by the military. Constitutionally they are the bearers of legitimate authority. As 
Clausewitz warned, the ends for which the military body is employed are outside its 
competence to judge. Indeed,  
The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be 
unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent 
faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse.62 
2. Civil Society and the Oversight Role  
Civil society can and indeed should play and important, though indirect, role in 
regulation, control and oversight. The input of civil society in the realm of public policy 
is seen as a hallmark of pluralist liberal democracy.63 The media has vehemently 
challenged government on defense issues especially on transparency, especially in view 
of the fact that political opposition is weak and the parliamentary watchdog role has been 
eroded. 64 The large military budget that the BDF continues to enjoy has also been a 
major area of contest. In 1998 when Botswana sent troops to Lesotho as part of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention force, the civil and 
political society challenged the failure by the executive to consult parliament.65 Despite 
rebuttal from government, the issue was a serious indication of the importance of the 
media as a watchdog of democratic governance. The Democracy Research Project of the 
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University of Botswana is also an important forum of civic oversight of the military.66 
The project has undertaken several research efforts on issues of governance in general 
which have touched on national security and defense. Similarly, the University’s 
Southern African Defense and Security Management forum (SADSEM) has organized 
seminars and workshops to promote discourse on national security issues in the country 
and sensitize participants on civil-military relations.67 
To this extent, civil society, particularly the media, has contributed to increasing 
awareness about the military and its relationship with government and the society it is 
intended to protect. Arguably, this has added to the growing pressure on government to 
consider a Defense Review. Contrary to the understanding that, “Civil Society and the 
armed forces must be constantly exposed to one another and should maintain an open and 
transparent dialogue,”68 this relationship has been cumbersome, and full of mistrust. 
Emang Basadi, a women’s rights non-governmental organization, has also been 
instrumental in the fight for integrating women in the military. In part, the recent decision 
by government to move in this direction comes as a result of their tireless efforts. Indeed, 
the enlisting of women in the army would mark a milestone in the gender war Botswana 
women have waged since the 1990’s.69 
Notwithstanding these achievements, civil society in Botswana is generally weak 
and does not have a strong voice. Comparatively speaking, civil society groups in 
Botswana are not as developed as in other African countries.70 There has generally been 
lack of constructive debate about issues of the military in Botswana. A number of 
country-dependent variables have been linked to this. Some observers have associated 
this with the fairly young and relatively undeveloped military culture in the country.71 
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Others submit that in general, civil society in Botswana is readily co-opted into state 
structures, lacks a strong grass-roots base, and is prepared to work within the parameters 
deemed permissible by the state-and not beyond.72  
Nonetheless the need for reforms is an important calling for Botswana’s 
democracy. There is need for heightened political participation, a stronger civil society 
and popular decision-making in general, and on the military and national security in 
particular. Although security policy is highly centralized within the president’s office, a 
broader debate over the nature of the country’s security situation, whether it is to do with 
HIV/AIDS, a rising crime and/or growing refugee inflows from Zimbabwe, mean that 
security is a hot topic in contemporary Botswana.73 The net result of civil society’s input 
is the ‘conscious voice of the enlightened’ impressing upon the state the need for open 
debate on the military and greater participation of the citizenry in the national security 
matrix. This contribution, though minimal, is not negligible. It stands to reason therefore 
that the greater the public debates over the military and defense, the greater the measure 
of control and participation the citizenry has in the democratic process. This important 
dynamic, is however, conspicuously absent in the political landscape of Botswana. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has underlined the importance of bureaucratization as one 
explanation of Botswana’s developmental success. It sought to demonstrate, however, 
that the benefits of bureaucratization have been overstated. I have also demonstrated how 
the over-commitment of the state to military professionalism has contributed to 
underdevelopment of a defense bureaucracy. I caution that professionalism as an-all-in-
one tool of democratic control without the accompanying institutional structures 
undermines the essence of democratic control. In fact, professionalization has serious 
shortfalls. It is difficult to measure, especially when there are no set benchmarks for 
military performance as is the case in Botswana. What for lack of a better word is the 
current bureaucracy for defense has remained sketchy and ad hoc despite the growth of 
the BDF and the rest of the state structure. The net result has been an over-development 
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of the military through professionalization without the simultaneous development of 
civilian expertise on the military. Consequently, this skewed approach has   rendered 
defense management and democratic control inefficient and ineffective. I have also 
underlined the power imbalances between parliament and the executive in the current 
arrangement, and demonstrated how they undermine democratic accountability and 
oversight. Overall, the military enjoys a lot of autonomy and thus has overbearing 
influence in defense policy because of lack of civilian expertise in governance. Such an 
imbalance is unhealthy for democracy. Finally, I have acknowledged the role of civil 
society as an important democratic watchdog in filling the institutional gap of oversight. 
However, there is need for more active engagement in this area. At the end of it all, the 
challenges for democratic control of the military remain. As more and more citizens get 
enlightened and fulfill their civic obligation, it becomes evident that there is a lot of 
‘house-keeping’ yet to be done. Check alignment all the way through 
The huge weaknesses in Botswana’s institutional matrix of democratic control 
have largely gone unnoticed by those who are overly excited about the country’s success. 
This is so mainly because the leadership, both political and within the military has 
heretofore not taken serious advantage of this institutional inadequacy. Political pundits 
have also used the leadership variable to account for Botswana’s success.  The next 
chapter focuses on elite cohesion and the evolution of the state to show why the country 
cannot continue to count on the integrity of leadership alone to sustain healthy civil-
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III. OF CONTRASTS AND ANIMATIONS: ELITE COHESION, 
STATE EVOLUTION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the role that political and military elites in shaping the 
evolution of the state and civil-military relations. The chapter argues that elite cohesion 
has compensated for institutional weaknesses in consolidating state evolution and 
maintaining healthy civil-military relations. Over the years, the size of both the political 
and military elites has resulted in over-arching elite cohesion. This cohesion has 
contributed to overall state stability, despite institutional weaknesses of democratic 
control. Consequently this relative institutional stability has led to the moderate ability to 
diffuse tensions over national defense policy and democratic civilian control. Luckily, 
there have not been any attempts by either side to take advantage of the institutional gap 
and abuse it to the detriment of the state. Yet the potential challenges of abuse remain 
omnipresent.  
This analysis considers two comparative case studies that have been defining 
moments of state evolution. These historical are important time-blocks in attempting to 
understand the development of the post-colonial state in Botswana. First the study 
examines the first two decades of independence (1966-1986) in order to demonstrate the 
marked differences of evolving elite politics and its impact on governance. This period 
marked a significant beginning of state development. The state bureaucracy was fairly 
small. There was a high degree of elite homogeneity and cohesion. Consequently, 
leadership was more in control and could enforce elite discipline. On the civil-military 
relations side there were few domestic issues to contend with given the threat perception 
and the development of the military. The threat was primarily seen in the context of 
invasions from Southern Rhodesia and other hot spots in the region. Thus with this 
external threat orientation of the state, civil-military tensions were more diffused. 
Political organization was still in its infancy. Civil society was a very small and weak 
block. 
Next the focus shifts to the 1990’s and beyond. Here, significant landmarks of 
contrast from the previous epoch are highlighted. The 1990’s are an important turning 
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point in the evolution of the state in Botswana. This period ushered in a new dynamic 
into the country’s politics where the state was heavily challenged more than ever before. 
Unlike in the first two decades, several weaknesses of the state were exposed. Corruption 
scandals emerged. Growing elite decontraction and fragmentation gave way to the 
emergence of internal party polarization, in both the opposition and the ruling party 
elites. State policy and democratic accountability were heavily challenged. As the elites 
and the bureaucracy grew in size and complexity, the “glue” that held the elites together 
and rendered state policy more unitary, lost strength and could no longer hold. A 
changing threat orientation of the state (internal crime, HIV/Aids) helped a better focus of 
the analytical lenses on defense and national security. As political and civil society began 
to assert itself, the weaknesses of the state were exposed even more. Consequently there 
developed “cracks” in the system, exposing in the process, the weakness of the state and 
inherent weaknesses of democratic control of the military. Invariably, these dynamics 
challenge the conventional wisdom of Botswana’s uniqueness as a “model of success”, 
“An African Miracle”, a “rare bird”, and call for a reconsideration of the variables of 
analysis. 
B. ELITE COHESION AND STATE EVOLUTION IN THE FORMATIVE 
DECADES 1966-1986 
At independence, Botswana’s political elite comprised a fairly small aggregate of 
commercial cattle ranching interests, the educated Tswana elite, the traditionalists 
(chiefs), and the colonial public service. The small size of the dominant class, its narrow 
and relatively homogeneous economic base and common ideological views provided a 
basis for unity.74 These class aggregates were significantly small and thus able to 
converge fairly well and aggregate themselves for political control of the state. As 
Samatar notes, the unity of the dominant class and the peasantariat’s disorganization are 
two critical concepts in understanding the way in which state-civil society relations 
evolved in Botswana.75 Parson buttresses this point, noting that the unity of this class was 
a result of gross underdevelopment of the colonial period …[and] absolutely modest 
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expectations in the early post-colonial period.76 In essence these elites were a less 
heterogeneous group and were thus able to strike ‘a mutual pact’ in the running of the 
state primarily because of their backgrounds. They came largely from the major tribes of 
the country whose political legitimacy also enjoys support from the traditional kingship 
connections and lineages. Some enjoyed traditional royal status, but the majority came 
from prominent families in their communities.77 This anatomy is important in 
understanding the evolution of the post-independence state, its search for legitimacy and 
stability, and power configurations within the state. Further, the anatomy is pertinent in 
appreciating the patterns of civil-military relations and institutional formulae of 
democratic control of the military.  
Arguably the elites were much privileged relative to the rest of the population 
because they were better educated, wealthier, and of higher ethnic and royal status.78 As 
such they had comparative advantage over the rest of the population. This sense of 
belonging and their comparative advantage provided the “magical glue” that made them a 
relatively more homogenous entity in the formative years of the state. Thus elite cohesion 
was stronger in the formative years. The overall impact was that there were few or no 
disputes at all, but more commonality of interests over state policy. Given a weak 
industrial base of the state, it became apparent that the formal state sector was the most 
lucrative employment opportunity for many. As a result, the core of the elite was to be 
located mainly in the state sector. These “New Men”79 articulated a vision for the people 
of Botswana grounded on the basis of a “strong post-independence state, aggressive 
pursuit of economic growth, fiscal discipline and an expanded, professional government 
bureaucracy.80  This leadership, blessed with the advantage of resources (particularly 
mineral discoveries in the mid-seventies and a favorable international environment), 
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managed to steer the country from the impoverished state in which it found itself at 
independence. Through five-year national development plans, government was able to 
articulate a robust and meticulous development path for the country. The small group of 
elites worked in concert with zeal and determination, sharing a common vision of 
development. Molutsi and Parson demonstrate how this group had compatible agendas 
from independence into the second decade.81  
During this period, intra-party politics were fairly seamless. The political 
landscape was mainly contested by three parties. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP), formed in 1962 was able to garner nation wide support, primarily because of the 
relatively homogenous economic interests of its leadership and their ideological 
orientation and kingship connections. The party appealed to a wide constituency of voters 
particularly because it was seen as more moderate compared to the opposition. As a 
result, it was able to consolidate its gains and make mileage out of this strength. Because 
of elite cohesion within its structures, the BDP was able to make significant in routes into 
the rural areas and legitimize its power over the fairly weak opposition. As the incumbent 
party, it also gained popularity through more and more development programs that were 
implemented. In the first general elections in 1965, the BDP won 28 of the 31 seats.  It 
was continuously returned to power in the elections that followed with a wide margin 
against the opposition. In 1984 the opposition managed to win a modest 5 seats against 
the ruling party’s 29.82  In the 1989 elections, the scales were still in favor of the BDP. 
The BNF, weakened by internal feuds only managed a paltry three seats. Five other 
parties could not win a single seat. This has meant that Botswana has been a de facto 
predominant party system since independence.83 The absence of well-organized and 
mobilized social groups that could challenge the dominance of the ruling class also 
glorified this elite unity. Civil society has been poorly developed and disorganized, and 
democratic input weak.84 The consequent has also been that the state would largely 
determine the direction of development undeterred. 
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At the formative years of the state, Seretse Khama’s eminence as a chief, a cattle 
owner, and an educated Motswana meant that because of his “many hats” he transcended 
the class divides within the elite clique, and also reached out to the ordinary citizens with 
his appeal. This simply legitimized his leadership over the elites and made him 
unchallengeable. In the absence of a challenger within the elites he was able to steer 
politics fairly ably within this state-class cohesion. A reported case of corruption in the 
early years of the independence serves to illustrate this reverence and further shows the 
robustness of elite class policing and restraint then. In the 1970’s after the discovery of 
diamonds, Minister Segokgo, then responsible for minerals and water affairs, was 
allegedly implicated in the disappearance of diamonds. President Khama is alleged to 
have told him that he “owed the people of Botswana an explanation” over the allegations. 
The message was loud and clear. The minister’s career and his credibility were hanging 
in the balance. The minister committed suicide a few days later. This was a clear signal 
that the leadership did not tolerate corruption, and could also effectively enforce 
sanctions against such behavior. The bottom line is that the ability of the leadership, both 
at the party and the state levels, to influence outcomes was more pronounced because of 
the unitary nature of the elite clique. 
The weak support base and poor organization of the opposition also gave the 
ruling party an easy ride to prominence, further boosting its legitimacy and the mandate 
to influence the direction of state development. The Botswana Peoples’ Party (BPP), the 
country’s first political party formed in 1960, and the Botswana Independence Party 
(BIP) enjoyed minimal support, especially in the northern part of the country where they 
were primarily based. For the most part during this era, the Botswana National Front 
(BNF) was the main opposition in parliament. The BNF was formed by, among others, a 
splinter faction from the BPP in 1965, a phenomenon that would become a major 
characterizing feature of opposition politics in years to come. Because of their leftist 
orientation, opposition parties did not readily appeal to the electorate then as they were 
seen as radical. Their performance in the formative years of independent Botswana was 
fairly weak. Historically the opposition has been marred by interminable intra-party 
squabbles and fragmentation often leading to the formation of splinter parties. As such, 
the lack of a strong and robust opposition meant that the ruling party’s hegemony over 
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the state machinery would go largely unchecked. This phenomenon would transcend this 
timeframe and beyond.  
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE 
STATE 
The context of state formation in Botswana may have also had an influence in the 
character of the elites and their attitudes towards national security issues. Because of 
indirect rule, Botswana attained independence without warfare and bloodshed. To this 
end, it can be argued that the elites, and the population at large, were to develop a non-
militaristic predisposition to state formation as opposed to their counterparts in the rest of 
the region. Another interesting dichotomy is the distinguishing character of the elite 
between ruling party and the opposition. The opposition attracted a significant number of 
those that had worked or studied and got heavily involved in the liberation struggle 
alongside their black colleagues in the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC), or had studied in the communist block. Several of these joined socialist 
parties such as the BPP, BIP and BNF, and were leading advocates of the creation of the 
military at independence. By contrast, the ruling party elites were vehemently opposed to 
this idea. Coupled with fear of military take-overs endemic in the rest of Africa then, this 
dynamic partially explains the perceived reluctance in creating an army. Such perceptions 
also help explain the adoption of certain policy postures in the new state such as 
centralization of power, and attitudes towards women integration in the military, and the 
development of a defense bureaucracy in later years.  
In the years following the creation of the BDF, it was to become evident that the 
costs of militarization did not matter so much as did maintaining a skewed balance of 
power within state institutions. The power configuration in the executive remained 
centralized and was further entrenched as the state bureaucracy grew bigger. 
Centralization was also seen as a cost-effective measure in bureaucratization. Meanwhile, 
the diamond boom and a favorable international market enabled the state to develop its 
military power substantially, yet keeping a firm grip over it through centralized 
command. The focus on professionalization, infrastructure development and upgrading 
the army’s technology was to become the main preoccupation of the state. As expenditure 
figures show, a great deal of resources went into these key aspects. This shift of 
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paradigms was largely due to the stable political-military elite alliance and the cumulative 
trust that has been built over time. This alliance has continued to sustain a relatively 
healthy civil-military relations balance in the void of a defense bureaucracy, weak 
legislative oversight, the moribund Defense Council, and a civil society constituency that 
was still learning how to stand on its feet.  
Within a decade of its creation, the BDF grew in size from a paltry 300 men to 
about 4000. The resolve by the state at early stage to create a professional and well-
disciplined army marked an important relationship between the military in its early 
development with the political leadership. General Merafhe, with the support of 
government trained his officers and men in well-credited institutions in the west.85 This 
era, though a good start, was characterized by “muddling through” in that there was a lot 
of new ground to cover in the development of the military. Such stewardship was 
instrumental in building the army that was to characterize post-colonial Botswana. Given 
the nature of the threat, the military focus was mainly on developing fighting capabilities. 
Despite its shortfalls, the BDF defended the country and was a credible deterrent against 
aggression, and an important assurance of growing state strength. An important 
relationship of asserting civilian supremacy over the armed forces was also established. 
Most importantly, a politico-military elite alliance was established. The bureaucracy 
responsible for the military was at this time sketchy to say the least. The terrain of civil-
military relations was a completely new one. The ‘navigating team’ was also new in the 
field. A lot was done to borrow from experiences elsewhere in the world to help build the 
military and assert control. Nevertheless a major breakthrough was attained in setting the 
stage for the future.  
An interesting development took place in 1979, two years after the formation of 
the BDF. Brigadier Ian Khama, then deputy commander of the BDF, was installed as 
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chief of the Bangwato tribe.86 This development was a landmark in the political history 
of independent Botswana. As both a military commander and chief, Ian Khama would 
also wear “many hats” like his father. In this dual role he was to cement the politico-
military elite cohesion and ensure state stability.  At an early age of twenty-six, he had 
been “inserted into the hierarchy of the military as second-in-command”87 in what Picard 
calls “...a demonstration of political adroitness and adaptability of the state.”88 Five years 
prior to the formation of the BDF, he was the first Motswana to be trained at the 
Sandhurst Military Academy, a deliberate move by his father to ensure added military 
loyalty to the state.89  
 This political callousness would underlie the over-arching relationship between 
the military and civilian elites. The   connection established would become a key feature 
of state evolution in subsequent years. The growing military-political elite cohesion 
would underexpose institutional weaknesses of democratic control. As shall be 
demonstrated later, the “Khama magic” would become a key ingredient in the recipe for 
state stability, especially in the 1990’s. Nonetheless, in the late 1980’s it was becoming 
evident that cohesion in the politico-military elites and state was being seriously 
challenged. Significant changes would, however emerge in the 1990’s. 
D. ‘CONTRASTS AND ANIMATIONS’: STATE CONSOLIDATION OR 
FRAGMENTATION? 
The 1990’s have been a period of reckoning both for the political and military 
elites. Fragmentation and decontraction in the elite cohort, both in the ruling and 
opposition parties, became increasingly elaborate as intra-party squabbles intensified. 
The size of the elites was growing considerably. Their interests were also becoming 
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diverse as investment opportunities broadened. Agriculture, while remaining the 
dominant sector was slowly facing competition from commerce, and other opportunities 
that were hitherto absent. A younger generation of the elite was infused into the party 
structures bringing elements of radicalism that were not commonplace before. Internal 
party stability would suffer serious setbacks in the 1990’s however, as major currents of 
turbulence began to show on the political landscape of the country. The 1991 Palapye 
BDP Congress heralded an unprecedented era of intense intra-party struggles. One of the 
key features of the congress was an emerging north-south divide in the contest for party 
political office against the “old guard” and the “modernizers”.90  
By the early 1990’s, the opposition had made significant in routes in broadening 
its support base. This was particularly so in the urban areas where the labor movement 
had put its weight behind the opposition given its frustration with the party in power. In 
the 1994 elections, the BNF scored an unprecedented victory scooping 13 seats in 
parliament. This therefore meant that the opposition had a bigger voice in parliament and 
could therefore challenge government from a stronger fort. Normatively, this meant an 
improvement in governance and state accountability. However, this development was 
short lived. The opposition was soon engulfed in yet another power feud. The historic 
Palapye conference in the run-up to the 1999 national elections shattered the hopes of a 
growing opposition for the country’s democracy. The BNF was polarized to a point of no 
return. Consequently the “concerned group” broke away, forming the Botswana Congress 
Party. Eleven of the 13 opposition members defected to the new party leaving the BNF 
with a minority in the National Assembly. Thus the BCP became the main opposition. 
The BCP’s glory was, however, short lived as most of the legislators in the previous 
government lost their seats in the elections and returned the role of main opposition to the 
BNF. The BDP has nevertheless maintained its relative hegemony in the political playing 
field. 
Similarly, signals began to show in the ruling party that the “happy elite 
marriage” and its honeymoon days were over. State institutions showed signs of decay 
and developed fault-lines, especially with the emergence of elite corruption. The 
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corruption scandals included, among other things, illegal land deals in which cabinet 
ministers and other key figures in the state machinery were implicated. They also 
involved abuse of public office at the Botswana Housing Corporation, and the National 
Development Bank.91 These revelations sent shock waves in the state bureaucracy and 
put Botswana’s accountability mechanisms and corruption levels on the international 
political spotlight. This spate of corruption marked a significant departure from previous 
levels of discipline and political leadership in the state. They were indicative of declining 
elite cohesion and rising institutional weaknesses. In all the cases, “gross mismanagement 
and dishonesty”92 in the state bureaucracy involving the elite was clear. 
At this point, it became increasingly clear that the elites were no longer able to 
hold tight together and police themselves. The “glue” simply lost its viscosity and 
adhesiveness. The over-arching cohesion was simply no longer amenable. As Good 
points out, “internal government checking mechanisms were either absent of 
ineffective.93 In addition, the emergence of good investigative reporting hitherto unseen 
in the country, helped boost the watchdog role of civil society and put the state under 
greater scrutiny. The rippling effects of these revelations also undermined internal party 
unity. Because of their implications in the land scandals, ministers Kwelagobe and 
Mmusi resigned on 8 March 1992 and also lost their party posts. They were reinstated at 
the Palapye Congress, Mmusi becoming party chairman and Kwelagobe secretary-
general respectively. This was considered a major victory for the “old guard” who were 
mainly supported by the party structures and the cattle owning elite. This restoration, so 
soon after the major land scandal caused severe strains in the party,94 a clear indicated 
that elite cohesion was on the doldrums. 
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As the elite feud intensified, General Khama retired from the BDF in 1998 and 
was inserted into the ruling party to stabilize the feud.95 He was seen as a neutral player. 
It was hoped that as a disciplinarian from the military, he would bring the party’s house 
to order and salvage the waning elite cohesion. The extent to which his insertion has 
helped the party is a moot case, especially given the further polarization of the party in 
recent months. Political analysts have argued that his recruitment into government 
leadership has exacerbated the tensions within the BDP and the public service.96 The run-
up to the Ghantsi conference in 2003, and its aftermath was a further manifestation of the 
intensification of the elite divide.  
More recently the introduction of a more transparent inner-party voting system in 
the BDP known as bulela ditswe (meaning free for all) in the recent primary elections has 
been an important test of inner-party democracy in Botswana.97  The system, copied 
from the opposition where it has also been a keg of dynamite, has not only ushered in a 
new development in the demographics of those eligible for contesting for power. It has 
also allowed a more youthful constituent of contesters for political office. By opening the 
floodgates, the system has undermined the foothold of the party old guard who has 
always enjoyed the comfort of being unanimously returned to power term after term. In a 
sense, it tops up challenges to the over-arching elite cohesion that has bolstered sate 
stability over the years. The test for inner-party democracy has been a major test for elite 
cohesion. The polarization it has caused is a signal of declining elite cohesion. 
E. THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DILEMMA: THE 1990’S AND 
BEYOND 
Beyond the first two decades of state evolution, problems of civil-military 
relations have intensified. Issues of military service conditions and pay have been a 
thorny development. The issues are particularly new in the history of the Botswana and 
have added a new twist to the otherwise relatively calm civil-military relations of the 
time. They have washed away the notion that Botswana’s military “has never threatened 
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the civilian and constitutional order.”98 The credibility of the demands advanced is not a 
subject of this discussion. However, they represent engendered structural problems of 
defense management perpetuated by the institutional matrix of democratic control. The 
net take here is that these problems are watered down by a combination of elite cohesion, 
though declining, and the state’s reactive appeasement of the military.  
In 1994 Mmegi reported allegations of a split in the BDP that was also affecting 
the military.99 The report alleged that factions in the BDP between former BDF 
commander Mompati Merafhe and BDP strongman Daniel Kwelagobe were “beginning 
to rock the army,” resulting in the “top brass in the army having to declare their 
loyalties.” The split, it was argued, was taking a north-south delineation resulting in the 
then Commander aligning himself with the northern faction while his deputy, Pheto, 
leaned towards the south. These allegations were a shock to many and marked a new 
political beginning. The point to take home from this is that this is evidence of growing 
elite fragmentation within the party structures. In the process of such turbulence, the 
military feels the ripples. For our analysis here, these flashpoints indicate that the 
politico-military elite cohesion is being eroded. When political authority cannot approach 
the military as a unitary establishment, then democratic control is at stake. 
Almost simultaneously with the scandals on the political side of the house, 
allegations of public office abuse and corruption in the military also surfaced. Media 
accounts of alleged corruption in the procurement and acquisition systems of the military 
also caught the nation by surprise. In response, government was to set up a commission 
to investigate the allegations.100 At about the same time, the Auditor General expressed 
frustration at his inability to access BDF accounts, rendering his capacity as an oversight 
mechanism for parliament wanting.101 As in the case of the political elites, it became 
evident that the military elites were unable to police themselves despite their 
professionalism. Further, it was apparent that the political instruments of oversight were 
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equally failing. At this point also, it became questionable whether professionalism as self-
restraint tool was paying off. The political will for investigating these serious allegations 
and acting against violators seems to be absent. At one level, problems of graft such as 
these attest to the dilemma of having a large organization as the BDF without an effective 
and well established civilian bureaucracy to police it continuously 
As the saga of elite decontraction unfolded, the state faced more challenges both 
from within and without. In an unprecedented turn of events, the newly elected youthful 
legislator, Boyce Sebetela, challenged the executive for failing to consult the legislature 
on the deployment of the BDF in an international peacekeeping mission in Lesotho in 
1998. Such a challenge was unprecedented. In a letter to the Vice President, Sebetela 
cautioned the VP that his ministry, Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, 
“should be exemplary in matters of basic democratic traditions of consultation and debate 
on all major decisions.”102 Sebetela further warned, “When the executive becomes so 
powerful as to take even the legislature for granted, then there is cause for concern for the 
future of direct and participative democracy.” He could not have put it better. This 
dilemma remains a major problematique in Botswana’s civil-military relations and 
democratic practice.  
 In his political cap, Vice President Khama flies army aircraft despite the public’s 
concern over this flagrant abuse of office.103 This has sparked debate within civil and 
political society questioning the power of the executive, the ombudsman, parliament and 
the military high command. The portrait carved in the process, is one of a polarized elite 
and a leadership devoid of control. Abuse of office can go unchecked or unsanctioned. 
Democratic governance is at stake. Democratic control of the military is equally 
undermined and compromised. A bad precedent is being set. Military professionalism 
and its self-restraining character cannot help the situation when the same pioneers of 
professionalization are at the core of abuse of state power.  
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The topography of contemporary Tswana society, and its military culture are 
challenging the stability of the state, undergirding the need for a refocus of analysis and 
approach. This problematique puts professionalization as a model of development on the 
spotlight. It challenges, at various levels of analysis, the extent to which professionalism 
is able to affect any organization, more so the military. What then has been the area of 
emphasis in the scheme of professionalization? Is the focus at the officer corps or soldier 
level or both? How much has it affected either side? Is there a disconnection in the 
process? More importantly for military command and control purposes, how much of the 
professionalism has been embedded in the junior ranks? In the final analysis, these 
developments validate the argument that elite cohesion is getting weaker by the day, and 
is less and less able to influence developments in their desired direction. More 
importantly, these insights render Botswana’s exceptionality as a model of democracy 
questionable. In sum, it is clear that elite cohesion is no longer able to mask the 
institutional weaknesses of civilian control. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter endeavored to demonstrate the relationship between elite cohesion 
and the evolution of the state in Botswana. In the formative years elite cohesion was 
relatively high because of the small size of the elite and their common interests. 
Consequently, the elites were more unitary. They could also self-police one another and 
thus direct both party and state policy. Over time, as the size of the elite became bigger, 
their interests diverged, undercutting the ability of the leadership to control and discipline 
them. In the 1990’s, I note the emergence of major fault-lines in the ruling elites. Here, 
the ruling party begins to experience unprecedented polarization. Consequently, state 
performance plummets as more and more corruption scandals surfaced. The “old guard” 
faces challenges from the “modernizers.” The divisions in the ruling elite also affect the 
military, leading to transfers and retirements in an attempt to try and stabilize the 
establishment. The military is equally troubled internally as discontent shows its ugly 
face. Overall, these are indicators that all is not well in the “African Miracle.” Despite all 
these problems, the status quo is largely kept intact by the over-arching cohesion between 
the military and political elites which is declining and cannot therefore be counted on as a 
reliable mechanism of democratic control. 
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The institutional lacuna remains. However it is evident that the ‘bolts’ that held 
the ‘body and chassis’ of state development and democratic control together cannot hold 
any longer, hence the need to create new structures and adopt new practices. The 
leadership variable alone cannot suffice to continue keeping the scales in the balance. 
Consequently, the civil-military relations topography typifies the metaphor ‘of contrasts 
and animations’ in that it portrays a deceiving portrait yet it is riddled with problems that 
undermine democratic governance.  The next chapter proposes an institutional matrix that 
could help the country’s predicament. The matrix is necessary, but not sufficient for state 
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IV. THE SEARCH FOR A NEW INSTITUTIONAL MATRIX OF 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters identified the institutional flaws of the current system of 
democratic civilian control of the military. It underlined the problems of over-
bureaucratization of other state sectors while defense has been neglected. Moreover, it 
highlighted the dynamics of elite cohesion, the state-military relationship, and the 
challenges this interaction poses to the state through potential subjective interferences 
and influence. It also sought to demonstrate the military elite’s contribution to the 
institutional gap in stabilizing civil-military relations over the years. In this sense the 
reader’s attention is drawn to the potential policy problems of the military’s autonomy in 
influencing defense policy. Too much autonomy compromises democratic control and 
political accountability.  
Against the backdrop of these problems, the creation of a defense bureaucracy 
and the reorganization of other institutions of oversight would help streamline 
institutional relationships of the military and the civilian political elite. It would also 
provide a forum for the development of a common understanding on the role of the 
military and the civilian authority over policy formulation and operational issues. More 
importantly, the new institutional tapestry would enhance civilian expertise on military 
and defense issues, and thus undo the military’s over-involvement in policy matters. This 
chapter, therefore, will endeavor to show how this reconfiguration could be done, and 
how it would affect the various processes involved. The role of the Defense Council 
should be redefined to include other sectors of national security. The council would thus 
have a broader mandate over national security affairs. Structures of parliamentary 
oversight should be redefined in order to adjust to the contemporary defense and security 
landscape of the country. This chapter therefore proposes a new institutional matrix of 
democratic civilian control. Botswana’s search for a new matrix comes at a time when 
the domestic, regional, and international contexts are fairly conducive for such a step.  
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B. A STRATEGIC DEFENSE REVIEW 
First and foremost, the country needs to take stock of the military, its current 
posture and its envisaged development in the medium to long term. The fact that “some 
cabinet ministers are as in the dark as the man in the street about the size and direction of 
the BDF”104 is an indication that there is a lot to be done not only in defense reform, but 
also in sensitizing the leadership and ordinary citizens about the military. Some ministers, 
it is argued, have expressed concern and lack of knowledge about the size and future 
projection of the BDF, yet they have at one stage held portfolios that covered the defense 
force.  
This therefore calls for a defense review. A defense review would unpack the 
vexing questions that constitute the national security landscape of contemporary 
Botswana. A defense review would provide a blue print of government’s objective 
assessment and review of Botswana’s national security needs. Key amongst these would 
be to identify and publicize the relevant structures responsible for national security 
policymaking in the country. In addition the review would apply an appropriate template 
to rationalize the allocation of requisite resources amongst competing interests to achieve 
national security objectives in the most cost effective and efficient manner. The primacy 
of a defense review is that it is consultative, and brings together actors hitherto excluded 
in the defense decision-making process.105 As such, it establishes a framework for 
strengthening the country’s civil-military relations by bringing together a diversity of 
opinion and critiques on national defense issues. Thus a defense review basically 
establishes national consensus on defense. In the words of one analyst, for defense to be 
effective, it requires public support and needs to command public confidence.106 
The review would also present options with respect to the size, roles, missions 
and structure of the Botswana Defense Force. Since the creation of the BDF in 1977, a lot 
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of changes have taken place in the national security arena as well as the regional security 
context. The review would therefore, identify priorities for defense, and help focus it in 
line with the resources required to meet those challenges. Currently the country faces a 
menace of rising crime, a phenomenon the police are unable to cope with on their own. 
To this end, the review would put the roles and missions of the military in the context of 
the contemporary threats facing the state. Moreover, the review would provide detailed 
and well-motivated budgetary forecasts and proposals to tally with the size and posture of 
the force. Particular attention would be paid to specific policies regarding the 
provisioning of logistic resources, and identifying appropriate technologies to optimize 
cost-effectiveness in managing the force. 
Rationalizing current spending, eliminating waste and unnecessary duplication, 
and determining the most cost-effective means of managing human and material 
resources are also competencies of the review.107 The key thing to note here is that 
whatever force design will be advocated by the review, it will have to be in congruence 
with the political, fiscal and practical realities of contemporary Botswana. To this end the 
review would contend with the human and material resources of the force. It would set 
the framework upon which equipment and human resource needs of the armed forces 
should be based. This would entail, inter alia, reviewing the current force structure, 
establishing the appropriate force composition, its future size, and reserve component. 
This would also tie up with the development of a policy framework for the integration of 
women in the BDF, and the revision of defense legislation to accommodate new 
developments in the defense sector. 
Overall, the defense review would provide a new template of defense 
organization, reform and management. More importantly, the review would establish a 
culture of consultation and broader participation in the national security decision-making 
process, thus increasing civilian expertise on issues of national security. Currently, there 
are indications that government is seriously considering undertaking the review. In this 
context therefore, the country would do well to learn from both its regional partners and 
elsewhere in the world, especially in developed democracies. The defense review 
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requires resources and political will in order to be undertaken successfully. This is a 
major challenge to both government and other would-be stakeholders to commit 
themselves fully to the process. In net, a review is a periodical process, a breather, if you 
will, in the life of the military and defense. It has both mechanical and organic 
dimensions to it. In the final analysis a review is a democratic instrument of asserting a 
nation’s oversight role over its military establishment, and is a recognition that the 
relative importance of factors in the national security matrix change over time.  
C. A DEFENSE BUREAUCRACY 
The need for a defense bureaucracy is an imperative that the Defense Review 
would have to contend with. A defense bureaucracy provides an institutional template 
within which both the military and the democratically elected civilian leaders interact and 
thus can each be held accountable for their actions in defense management. In essence, 
therefore, such a bureaucracy is desirable for the overall goal of good governance and 
transparency. The establishment of a defense bureaucracy goes well with Weber’s 
argument that, “The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has 
always been its purely technical superiority over any form of organization.”108  
For Botswana in particular, the dilemma of statecraft and democratic control is 
the lack of civilian expertise on the military and defense. Thus a defense bureaucracy, 
separate from the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration is desirable 
in that it would divorce the military, a peculiar organization by all means, from the police 
and the civil service, as is the case in the current setup. Defense concerns the security of a 
nation and inherently involves decisions about committing lives and other resources for 
the nation’s defense and security. At best, the management of violence involves decisions 
of live and death. The military as the principal possessor of the monopoly of the means of 
violence naturally assumes a special and distinctive position in society. This therefore 
dictates that they have a distinct bureaucratic institution that would not only understand 
their vocation, but also seek to respond as best as possible to their special demands. 
Above all, such a bureaucracy should have the requisite expertise on the ‘the baby’ it is 
supposed to nurse and nurture. 
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As Bruneau and Goetze point out, the very existence of a Ministry of Defense 
(MoD) is an important basic indicator of the overall situation of civilian-military relations 
in a country.109 For Botswana, the absence of a MoD goes to show the dilemmas that the 
current system has despite its relative stability in maintaining healthy civil-military 
relations. In the absence of a MoD in Botswana, the functions outlined here may seem 
simple yet they are not. In a nutshell, these functions provide an operational template 
within which a defense bureaucracy operates: 
• First, a MOD would structure the power relations between democratically 
elected civilians and the armed forces. It essentially institutionalizes the 
relationship between the democratically elected representatives and those 
who hold the monopoly of force.  
• Second, a MoD would sort out or define and allocate responsibilities 
between and among civilians and military officers. The emphasis here is 
less about civilian control than it is about the division of tasks and 
responsibilities. A key factor in the rational definition and allocation of 
responsibilities, is the role of a MoD as buffer between politics and the 
armed forces 
• A third purpose in creating a MoD is to maximize the effectiveness of 
employment of the armed forces. Effectiveness in this case means the 
capacity to implement policies through the use of armed force. 
• The fourth and last major purpose in creating a MoD is to maximize 
efficient use of resources (e.g., funds, personnel, and equipment) as roles 
and missions change. Efficiency in this instance means the ability to 
achieve a goal at the lowest possible cost. 110 
These core functions deserve analysis here in order to place them in context. In a 
situation where there is no defense bureaucracy, it is obvious that creating one would 
change the institutional relations and power dynamics of the state. Following from the 
functions outlined above, some of the new developments a defense bureaucracy would 
usher into Botswana’s national security portrait include the following:   
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1. Redefining the Political Chain of Command 
A MoD is the core institution that stands at the center of the paradoxical civil-
military question of “who guards the guardians.” The form, function and institutional 
relationships of a MoD go a long way in addressing some of the most pertinent issues in 
civil-military relations in modern democracies. As indicated earlier, the current 
arrangement in Botswana is such that this relationship is not clearly defined and lacks the 
desirable institutional machinations of bureaucratic organization. 
It is currently ambiguous as to who is responsible for the management of the 
defense sector. Moreover, the current defense management system is sketchy and ad hoc, 
and thus fails to prevail over defense issues effectively and efficiently. The fact that 
defense is clustered with the police and the civil service is also problematic. The civilian-
military staff interaction on operational and policy matters is conspicuously absent.  
Likewise, civilian expertise on the military is seriously lacking in the current framework. 
Creating a MoD would therefore bring the two competencies together and ensure that a 
civilian-military mix of expertise is brought under one house. With a defense bureaucracy 
and such competencies at his/her disposal, the minister would advise the president on 
military and defense matters more authoritatively. 
2. New Relationships and a New Culture of Civil-Military Relations 
Equally important, a MOD would establish a line relationship with other 
ministries and address issues of defense at par. The minister would relate with the rest of 
his cabinet and parliamentary colleagues equally, and in so doing, engender a new culture 
of institutional relationships. Furthermore, institutional relationships would be established 
between the ministry, and other organizations within the state bureaucracy, as well as the 
private sector.  Above all, a defense bureaucracy would create a new culture of civil-
military relations, one that puts the chief of the armed forces in his rightful place as 
advisor, whereas the permanent secretary would be the accounting officer for the 
ministry. On budgeting and related expenditure processes, the accounting officer, would 
be able to relate with his/her colleagues in other ministries, and articulate demands and 
responses of the defense sector more ably than is the case currently. In the long run, a 
defense bureaucracy would also add value to the human and material resources needed in 
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both parliament and the National Security Council, especially in the relevant defense and 
security committees. This would also improve parliamentary expertise on defense. 
Similarly, a MoD would help broaden the interest of legislators and others in matters 
pertaining to the armed forces, national security and defense, beyond a typically small 
group in the executive branch.111 As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the current 
institutional matrix of democratic control pegs these issues primarily in the executive, 
and thus denies other players and interested parties an opportunity not only to know, but 
also to participate in the process. To this end, a MoD would provide a window of 
opportunity to policy makers, civil society and individuals to access information on 
national defense.  
3. Defining Roles and Missions 
In a democracy, democratically elected civilians determine national strategy and 
the functions of the armed forces.112 Defining roles and missions is therefore one of the 
key functions of a MoD. As one observer pointed out, Government should develop a 
policy relative to which military affairs issues should fall within the public domain 
(including parliamentary accountability) and which should not.113 
Roles and missions spell out the purposes for which the military exists. As an 
extension of executive control, a MoD would focus primarily on the formulation of 
military and defense policy. Thus far, a defense bureaucracy would allocate resources to 
various services of the military. Normatively, this would improve allocative and spending 
efficiency, not only in the management of the resources themselves, but also in ensuring 
that the services utilize the resources according to established performance bench-marks 
that relate to the overall roles and missions of the military. Within the defense sector, the 
allocation of resources for training, personnel, and equipments should reflect the roles 
and missions for the armed forces established during a process of national security 
                                                 
111 ibid, p.34. 
112 See “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age,”(Washington DC.: White House, December, 
2000), pp.i-67. 
113 “How Can Botswana Improve Its Democracy?” A Discussion of the Symposium in Holm and 
Molutsi, op cit, p.295. 
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planning.114 In seeking to meet the requirements for training and development, the 
budget should therefore seek to respond to the bigger objectives set by roles and missions 
set within the framework of a national security policy. 
4. Budget and Personnel Development 
The competence of the military-civilian bureaucracy is a major factor that bears 
directly on the management of defense expenditure. Merging competencies and asserting 
control through a defense bureaucracy is therefore an important attribute of accountable 
governance. For one, a MoD relocates the role of the chief of defense forces, removing 
him from being the accounting officer for the force and placing that role within the ambit 
of the secretary of defense. Equally important, decisions on personnel and training must 
be made within the MoD given their complexity and sensitivity. Under the present setup 
in Botswana, such decisions are largely made at BDF headquarters. A combination of 
military and civilian expertise is desirable for determining force structure, analyzing 
threats and vulnerabilities, and aligning combat capabilities with appropriate resources. 
As argued in Chapter II, defense is not “just another spending department.” The defense 
budget is complex and requires particular expertise. A defense bureaucracy would thus 
bridge the current institutional flaws in budgeting and accountability characteristic of the 
current relationship between the Ministries of Presidential Affairs and Finance and 
Development Planning. A defense bureaucracy would go a long way in improving 
defense budgeting capabilities, and ensuring that the taxpayer gets value for their money 
at least in terms of systems of management. 
Defense equipment programs entail acquisition and maintenance of high cost 
items with complicated life spans. The programs involve forward commitments of 
resources that are spread over a long time. Thus the process requires a combination of 
specialized technical and management expertise in order to attain efficiency and 
effectiveness. A defense bureaucracy provides the right platform for the organization and 
development of such skills. Similarly, issues of conditions of service of the military 
would be understood and put in perspective under a defense bureaucracy. Over the years, 
it has been difficult to argue a case for the peculiarity of defense, a thing that perhaps has 
                                                 
114 Jeanne K. Giraldo, “Defense Budgets and Civilian Oversight,” Occasional Paper #9, Center for 
Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2001), p.5. 
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influenced a reactive rather proactive policy in addressing military conditions of service 
as argued earlier. A MoD as a political and administrative entity would help create a 
better understanding of defense overall, and help formulate appropriate budgetary and 
managerial measures to address them. More importantly, a defense bureaucracy would 
trim the military’s over involvement in defense policy by counter-balancing it with more 
civilian expertise. 
In addition, a MoD would also pay particular attention to issues of military 
benefits, both during and after service, as well as articulate an appropriate active and 
reserve force composition and posture. Currently, as more and more members of the first 
generation of the BDF retire, there are indications that they have not been adequately 
prepared for post-service life. Some retirees, particularly some of the first to leave 
service, have expressed concern over this issue, arguing that they fear that once they are 
out they are simply forgotten.115 Although there have been indications in the military that 
there is a concern for this problem, issues of implementation capacity remain a major 
setback. Even then, the policy decision to design retirement programs and related 
management aspects of those programs, and to manage them, belong to a higher 
authority. 
5. Issues of Women’s Integration 
A defense bureaucracy would formulate policy to guide the gradual integration of 
women in the military. This area has been problematic for many countries even for 
developed democracies. The experiences of these other nations with issues such as 
fraternization should serve as insights to how Botswana could best handle similar 
problems.116 Further, the integration of women would need a special regime to 
accommodate their peculiarities such as issues of families, spouses, etc. Closer home, 
South Africa, Malawi and other neighboring states would be instrumental in setting the 
stage for women integration in the BDF. 
                                                 
115 Major General P.J. Motang (Ret.) articulated this problem quite vividly during an interview with 
this author on January 16, 2004 in Goodhope, Botswana.Motang, is one of the founding fathers of the BDF, 
and retired as Deputy Commander, in 1992. 
116 For a detailed account of women integration in the military and its potential problems for 
Botswana, see Mpho C. Mophuting, “Expanding the Shield and Facing the Challenges: Integration of 
Women in the Botswana Defense Force.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California: March 2003. 
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6. A Vehicle for Regional and International Security Building 
On the international scene, a MoD would have to interact with various actors 
involved in international defense and security. Within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) framework, a defense bureaucracy would help solidify the country’s 
regional military relations. This would improve bilateral and multilateral ties between the 
ministry and its equals in the region. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security 
is one such framework for this kind of interaction. Similarly, Botswana’s defense roles 
would be put in better perspective in the African Union, the United Nations and other 
international bodies when articulated by the MoD in concert with the Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation ministry. In the process, defense and foreign policy would be 
better synchronized. This relationship would also avoid some of the pitfalls experienced 
in past peacekeeping missions. 
7. Research and Development 
One of the major handicaps of the current matrix of democratic control is the 
absence of research and discourse of the military and defense. With a research unit, a 
defense bureaucracy would also help promote a culture of research, documentation and 
debate about the military’s development. With a lifetime of close to thirty years, the BDF 
has a rich history that must be recorded for future generations. The first generation of 
soldiers retires and goes home unnoticed, yet they have a lot to tell about their 
experiences in service. These ‘mobile archives’ have engraved in them a wealth of 
knowledge that if untapped with would be a major loss to the nation’s history and 
defense. Developments in science and technology also require continuous enquiry, 
especially given that the military is a major consumer of these commodities. Research is 
therefore desirable.  
D. REFORMING THE DEFENSE COUNCIL 
The Defense Council does not fulfill the role of a defense bureaucracy at all. In its 
current posture, the council does not give the taxpayer value for their money because of 
its narrow focus. Within the new institutional framework, the role of the Defense Council 
would essentially be taken over by a MoD. With the creation of defense bureaucracy, it 
would be in the national interest to give the council a new form and mandate. To derive 
better utility out of the arrangement, creating a National Security Council (NSC) out of 
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the Defense Council would be prudent. This would give it a more active role in issues of 
national security. In so doing this would broaden the scope of its business. The NSC 
would comprise representation from key stakeholders in the national security sector such 
as the MoD, the police, intelligence community, Wildlife and National Parks, National 
Disaster Preparedness Committee, National Aids Council and others.  Among others, it 
would look at the following: 
• The formulation of a national security policy so as to harmonize national 
security interests with foreign policy, trade and commerce. 
• Advise the president/executive on broader issues of national security. 
• Synchronize the efforts and energies of various national security actors in 
the achievement of the broader national security objectives. 
• Synchronizing defense policy and national security strategy. 
The need to reconcile national security interests between the military, police, 
department of wildlife and national parks and the intelligence branch of the state is a 
necessary condition for statecraft. It becomes necessarily so when these sectors compete 
for similar resources and often play overlapping roles. Currently, the major threat facing 
the state is growing crime. The police are unable to cope with the high crime rate because 
of institutional inadequacies. Their budget has continuously remained lower than that of 
the military despite changes in the security equation. The net result is that the peace 
dividend is eroded in the process. This obviously discourages investment.  
With an infection rate of 38.5 percent, amongst the highest in the world, the 
HIV/Aids scourge currently presents the greatest national security threat to Botswana. 
More recently, illegal immigrants have also added a twist to the country’s national 
security dilemma. Efforts in fighting the HIV/Aids scourge, combating rising crime, 
dealing with immigration issues and the proliferation of small arms, and any future 
developments in this area, must necessarily be synchronized within a high political 
structure such as the NSC. Similarly, as the fluid nature of international terrorism rears its 
head in various manifestations, it is pertinent for the country to consider critical 
infrastructure protection more seriously. It would be a fallacy to think that Botswana is 
not vulnerable. The vulnerability of the diamond mining industry, undoubtedly a key 
national asset, should also be considered under the NSC. 
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E. CREATING A PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 
The parliamentary committee on trade, foreign affairs and security is not adequate 
in its form to address defense issues. Its agenda is too broad and covers a wide area of 
important issues of national interest. It lacks expertise on defense. It is therefore doubtful 
that it can devote enough attention to defense. A better approach would be to create a 
separate Defense Committee. The Defense Committee would thus devote thorough 
attention to issues of the defense budget, acquisition programs and would also evaluate 
the lead-time between procurement and final use of the products. These are very complex 
and cannot only be left to the military and the suppliers. Between the approval of the 
budget and the actual processes of acquisition, there is need to strengthen the oversight 
role of parliament.  
Over time, with combined technical and administrative expertise from the MoD, 
the committee would be better placed to monitor the use of public monies and assert its 
parliamentary oversight role more competently. To this end, the potential for abuse of 
office and corruption in acquisition processes would be minimized. Once a MOD has 
been created, the committee would benefit considerably from the expert support of the 
ministry’s staff, and help improve oversight capacity and efficiency. A Defense 
committee is likely to enhance knowledge about the requirements of the defense sector 
more ably than would a broad-based committee as the current arrangement provides. 
Defense committees also serve to balance the right of the public in a democracy to be 
informed and the need for secrecy that governs some activities and policies in the realm 
of national security affairs.117 
In the search for a new institutional framework of democratic control, it would 
also be prudent to create a structure within parliament to look at officer promotions. The 
location of officer promotions in the executive undermines the principle of separation of 
powers. In addition, it undercuts the legislature’s oversight role on the development of 
the military. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to metaphorically “unpack the boxes” by assessing 
institutions of democratic civilian control of the military in Botswana. First and foremost, 
the thesis has attempted to apply an institutionalist approach to the problems of civilian 
control in Botswana. It has sought to demonstrate the inherent weaknesses in the current 
institutional framework of civilian control of the military and how such a framework may 
lead to setbacks in healthy civil military relations and democratic governance. In 
particular, it underlined the problems of centralized power in the Office of the 
Presidency, and identified potential problems to democracy such power dynamics may 
pose. Further, this work delved into the institutional inadequacies of the sketchy and ad 
hoc defense bureaucracy that the country has. In this regard, the problems of 
professionalization without developing a strong defense bureaucracy were highlighted. 
Also underscored were the dilemmas of the Defense Council, challenging its relevance to 
Botswana’s current topography of national security. It was also argued that the Ministry 
of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration (MPAPA) is not an adequate 
bureaucracy for defense because it has a lot in its hands to contend with. Consequently, 
its efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with defense is questionable.  
By extension, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) 
derives little benefit from the current bureaucracy because of its weaknesses and may not 
necessarily be giving the taxpayer the best benefit for defense, especially given the high 
spending on the military. Similarly, this thesis highlighted oversight shortfalls of the 
legislature, particularly focusing on the parliamentary committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Security.  In addition, it delved into the issue of elite-class interactions and 
how they have influenced the evolution of the post-colonial state and civil-military 
relations over the years. To this extent, the preoccupation with professionalization as a 
tool for military development is necessary but not sufficient. What the country needs 
more than ever before are robust institutions that would be supported by accountable, 
responsible and responsive leadership. Institutions have a demonstrative capacity and are 
able to transcend personalities. Institutions help create regulative norms in society. They 
help socialize individuals and groups into certain patterns of behavior. 
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In the final analysis, this thesis has argued a case for a new institutional matrix of 
democratic control. The need to clearly and objectively define the role of the armed 
forces, and other sectors of national security is a pressing one.  The best instrument for 
such an exercise of statecraft is a strategic defense review. Government is contemplating 
a strategic defense review for Botswana. This is a long awaited measure that will help 
shape the national security paradox of the country. It is an exercise that will need political 
will and commitment on the part of al the stakeholders. Hopefully, the review will 
identify, among others, the pressing need for a defense bureaucracy. By outlining the 
potential benefits of a defense bureaucracy, one sees how it will impact the civil-military 
interactions domestically and internationally. Further recommendations include the 
reconfiguration of the Defense Council into a National Security Council to broaden its 
mandate. Such a development would add value to the country’s institutional capacity in 
national security decision-making. In like manner is proposed the creation of a 
parliamentary committee on defense, separate from the current arrangement where the 
committee has a lot of equally sensitive issues of national security to handle. However, it 
is noted that the institutional reconfiguration should be done within the context of 
capabilities. It must be understood that defense reform and the creation of a defense 
bureaucracy is a long-term project in its own right and cannot be achieved overnight. It 
has to be done piecemeal to allow the country to develop the requisite skills to match the 
management needs of the country and its historical stage. Overall, the new institutional 
matrix would enhance civilian expertise on defense and thus guard against military 
encroachment in the policy realm. 
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